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Thank You All the Same, but I’d Rather Not 
Be Seized Today: The Constitutionality of 
Ruse Checkpoints under the Fourth 
Amendment 
NADIA B. SOREE† 
INTRODUCTION 
American roadways have increasingly become a major 
point of interaction between citizens and police. A 
Department of Justice study conducted in 2008 revealed that 
almost sixty percent of all contact between United States 
residents and police arose in the context of traffic incidents.1 
Moreover, approximately five percent of all traffic stops 
resulted in a search of the driver, vehicle, or both.2 As is the 
case with any citizen-police contact, these encounters create 
the opportunity for police to investigate a variety of criminal 
activity unrelated to the ostensible reason for the contact. 
 
† Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School. 
I wish to thank my colleagues at St. Thomas University School of Law for their 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article, presented as part of the 
Faculty Colloquium Series, and would like to thank Tamara Lawson in particular 
for her valuable insights. I am also grateful to Christina Fernandez for her 
excellent research assistance. 
 1. CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 
234599, CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 3 tbl.2 (2011), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccp08.pdf. Interestingly, while the overall 
percentage of residents having contact with police (for any reason) has declined 
from 21% in 2002 to 16.9% in 2008, the percentage of residents having traffic-
related contact with police has remained relatively steady—decreasing from 
11.1% in 2002 to 10% in 2008. Id. at 3 tbl.3. In fact, during this time period, the 
percentage of all resident-police contact arising from traffic-related incidents has 
increased, from 52.8% in 2002 to 59.2% in 2008. Id. at 3 tbl.2. 
 2. Id. at 10 tbl.14. 
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Although the primary focus of this Article is on the use 
of one particular investigative tool—the ruse narcotics 
checkpoint—the importance of carefully and critically 
evaluating the ways in which police officers are permitted to 
confront and interact with citizens on the roads cannot be 
overstated. Numerous studies have demonstrated that 
minority drivers are stopped disproportionately in 
comparison to their white counterparts.3 And, as all too 
many news stories have recently reminded us, these traffic 
stops can lead to tragic consequences and loss of life. As only 
one of many examples of the danger—particularly to young 
African American men—inherent in a routine traffic stop, 
the reader may remember that, on a summer evening in 
Minnesota, Philando Castile was shot to death in the 
presence of his girlfriend and her young daughter after being 
pulled over for a broken taillight.4 Routine traffic stops put 
officers at risk as well; one report indicates that of sixty-four 
officer fatalities involving a firearm in 2016, three such 
fatalities occurred during traffic stops.5 Thus, it is imperative 
to reassess policing on the roadways, and, in particular, the 
ways in which the Supreme Court has adopted an overly 
permissive and deferential stance on the investigative 
approaches that can be utilized by police under the Fourth 
 
 3. See, e.g., AMY FARRELL ET AL., NORTHEASTERN U. INST. ON RACE & JUSTICE, 
RHODE ISLAND TRAFFIC STOP STATISTICS ACT FINAL REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1 (2003), http://www.dot.ri.gov/community/CCPRA/docs/2003_Rhode_Island_
Traffic_Stop_Statistics_Final_Report_NU.pdf (“In most communities in Rhode 
Island non-white drivers are stopped disproportionately to their presence in the 
driving population.”); STEPHEN M. HAAS ET AL., DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS CTR., WEST VIRGINIA TRAFFIC STOP 
STUDY FINAL REPORT (2009), http://www.djcs.wv.gov/ORSP/SAC/Documents/WV
AC_Traffic_NEWOverviewofStatewideFindings.2009.pdf (“State-level results 
indicate that black drivers are 1.64 times more likely . . . [and] Hispanics were 
1.48 times more likely to be stopped compared to white drivers.”). 
 4. Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in Killing of Philando Castile, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/us/police-
shooting;trial-philando-castile.html?mcubz=0. 
 5. NAT’L LAW ENF’T OFFICERS MEM’L FUND, PRELIMINARY 2016 LAW 
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER FATALITIES REPORT 1–2 (2016), http://www.nleomf.org/
assets/pdfs/reports/Preliminary-2016-EOY-Officer-Fatalities-Report.pdf. 
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Amendment.6 
The Court has, through numerous decisions, facilitated 
police investigation of criminal activity in the guise of traffic 
enforcement, rendering the roadways a significant front in 
fighting the so-called “War on Drugs.” For example, the 
Court has held that “mere[] passengers” cannot claim a 
“legitimate expectation of privacy” in the cars they occupy, 
and thus, cannot seek to suppress evidence found in the 
unlawful searches of those vehicles.7 Thus, even unlawful 
searches, at least of those vehicles containing multiple 
occupants, can be fruitful ground for law enforcement 
seeking evidence of criminal wrongdoing.8 Of course, perhaps 
no decision has been more helpful to law enforcement 
seeking to investigate criminal activity than Whren v. United 
States, which held that, as long as an officer has probable 
cause to stop a vehicle, for example, if the driver committed 
even a minor traffic offense, the ensuing seizure is 
reasonable regardless of the officer’s true motivations in 
executing the stop.9 Although Whren’s holding specifies 
 
 6. The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 7. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978). The Court in Rakas merged 
the “standing” inquiry, governing who may properly invoke the exclusionary rule, 
with the substantive definition of a search, holding that the defendant, as a mere 
passenger in the automobile that had been searched, lacked the requisite 
expectation of privacy to permit him to challenge the search. Id. See infra note 
175 for a discussion of Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a 
description and critique of the Court’s treatment of Fourth Amendment standing, 
see Nadia B. Soree, The Demise of Fourth Amendment Standing: From Standing 
Room to Center Orchestra, 8 NEV. L. J. 570 (2008). 
 8. As stated by Justice White in his dissent, “the Court’s opinion today 
declares an ‘open season’ on automobiles.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 157 (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 9. 517 U.S. 806, 813, 819 (1996). As stated by one scholar, “with the traffic 
code in hand, any officer can stop any driver any time. The most the officer will 
have to do is ‘tail [a driver] for a while,’ and probable cause will materialize like 
magic.” David A Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses: 
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
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probable cause as the standard justifying the stop, the 
Court’s reasoning supports the conclusion that a traffic stop 
based on an officer’s objective reasonable suspicion would 
also be justified, regardless of the officer’s subjective 
intentions regarding the stop. 
Adding to Whren’s potency as a law enforcement tool, the 
Court, in Navarette v. California, recently upheld a traffic 
stop as supported by “reasonable suspicion that the driver 
was intoxicated” based only on an anonymous 9-1-1 caller’s 
assertion that the vehicle in question had “run her off the 
road,” although the officer, after tailing the truck for five 
minutes, did not personally observe any reckless or improper 
driving.10 When combined with Whren, the exceedingly low 
standard of reasonable suspicion articulated by the Court in 
Navarette truly provides officers with the means to “single 
out almost whomever they wish for a stop.”11 
The Court has also sanctioned suspicionless seizures of 
drivers and passengers in their vehicles pursuant to vehicle 
checkpoints conducted for purposes of enforcing immigration 
laws,12 highway sobriety,13 and licensing and registration 
requirements.14 As is the case with any lawful stop, whether 
based on suspicion or not, police do not need to ignore other 
 
544, 559 (1997). When the officer’s true motivations for conducting the stop are 
unexamined and irrelevant, as long as a stop is based on probable cause, derived 
from the traffic violation, it does not matter, for Fourth Amendment purposes, if 
the officer was acting from racial animus. As the Court stated, “We of course 
agree . . . that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the law based 
on considerations such as race. But the constitutional basis for objecting to 
intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, 
not the Fourth Amendment.” Whren, 517 U.S. at 813 (emphasis added). For a 
more thorough discussion of Whren, see infra Part III. See also Nadia B. Soree, 
The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Fourth Amendment: The Plight of Unreasonably 
Seized Passengers Under the Heightened Factual Nexus Approach to Exclusion, 
51 AM. CRIM L. REV. 601, 639–41 (2014). 
 10. Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686–87 (2014). 
 11. Whren, 517 U.S. at 818. 
 12. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 576 (1976). 
 13. Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990). 
 14. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). 
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indicators of criminal activity that may arise during the stop. 
Indeed, officers may ask questions unrelated to the reason 
for the stop,15 and are permitted to employ the use of a 
narcotics-detection dog,16 as long as these additional 
investigative activities are conducted within the lawful 
temporal limits of the stop. 
Although police may essentially conduct a collateral 
narcotics investigation pursuant to and within the confines 
of a sobriety or license and registration checkpoint, the Court 
drew a line in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, prohibiting 
the suspicionless seizures of drivers through checkpoints 
conducted for the primary purpose of advancing “the general 
interest in crime control.”17 In doing so, the Court expressed 
its fear that “[w]ithout drawing the line at roadblocks 
designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime 
control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent 
such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American 
life.”18 Thus, despite having found suspicionless checkpoints 
for certain purposes, unrelated to general law enforcement 
needs, to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,19 the 
Court, in Edmond, reiterated its “reluctan[ce] to recognize 
exceptions to the general rule of individualized suspicion,”20 
 
 15. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 101 (2005) (holding that questioning 
regarding defendant’s immigration status during a lawful detention, while police 
executed a search warrant, did not extend the detention and therefore did not 
require further Fourth Amendment justification). 
 16. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (“A dog sniff conducted 
during a concededly lawful traffic stop . . . does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”). The Court noted, however, that the outcome would be different if 
the dog sniff occurred when the defendant was unlawfully detained, such as if 
the traffic stop was “prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete 
that mission.” Id. at 407–08. 
 17. 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2000) (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n.18). 
 18. Id. at 42. 
 19. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990); 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 576 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 12–14. 
 20. Edmond, 531 U.S at 43. 
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stating that, “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue 
primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints such 
as here, however, stops can only be justified by some 
quantum of individualized suspicion.”21 
In the wake of Edmond, police departments developed a 
new breed of checkpoint, designed to either, depending on 
one’s view, comply with or circumvent the rule and spirit of 
Edmond: the ruse checkpoint. Ruse checkpoint programs all 
operate in essentially the same fashion.22 Police set up signs 
on a highway advising motorists of a drug interdiction 
checkpoint ahead. Of course, there is no such checkpoint 
ahead on the highway, as such a checkpoint would clearly be 
unlawful under Edmond. Nevertheless, the driver “take[s] 
the bait,”23 and decides to take the first available exit—
generally one in a remote area that does not immediately 
provide access to any services, such as a gas station or 
 
 21. Id. at 47. Edmond does not specify, however, what quantum of suspicion 
would be necessary, though it would seem that reasonable suspicion would be the 
correct standard. 
 22. Numerous authors have described the basic structure of the ruse narcotics 
checkpoint, and have offered their evaluations of these checkpoints. See, e.g., 
Dustin P. Deschamp, Note, The Missouri Supreme Court Approves a 
Controversial Police Drug Enforcement Tactic Used on Missouri Highways Code 
Name: “Gotcha!” A Case Note on State v. Mack, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 669 (2004); 
Daniel R. Dinger & John S. Dinger, Deceptive Drug Checkpoints and 
Individualized Suspicion: Can Law Enforcement Really Deceive Its Way into a 
Drug Trafficking Conviction?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (2002); Kathryn L. Howard, 
Note, Stop in the Name of that Checkpoint: Sacrificing Our Fourth Amendment 
Right in Order to Prevent Criminal Activity, 68 MO. L. REV. 485 (2003); Travis 
Johnson, Note, Ruse Drug Checkpoints: How the Government’s False Advertising 
May Diminish Your Fourth Amendment Rights, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 781 (2005); 
Allison M. Low, Comment, Designing a Constitutional Ruse Drug Checkpoint: 
What Does the Fourth Amendment Really Protect?, 44 U. S.F. L. REV. 955 (2010); 
Theresa A. O’Loughlin, Note, Guerillas in the Midst: The Dangers of Unchecked 
Police Powers Through the Use of Law Enforcement Checkpoints, 6 SUFFOLK J. 
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 59 (2001); Luke R. Spellmeier, Comment, Bypassing the 
Fourth Amendment: The Missouri Supreme Court’s Use of “Ruse” Reasonable 
Suspicion to Justify De Facto Drug Interdiction Checkpoints, 42 WASHBURN L. J. 
209 (2002). 
 23. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002). 
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restaurant.24 This leads to the inference that the driver has 
chosen to exit the freeway because he seeks to avoid the 
advertised (but nonexistent) checkpoint. Of course, even if 
the driver is motivated by the desire to avoid the checkpoint, 
this alone does not lead to the inevitable conclusion that the 
driver is hoping to avoid detection of unlawful drug 
possession, as the driver may wish to avoid the hassle and 
delay involved in a checkpoint. Or, perhaps the driver simply 
does not wish to be seized that day. 
At this point, the structures of the checkpoints begin to 
vary as they have evolved in response to constitutional 
concerns. In what one author has termed “first generation 
ruse drug checkpoints,”25 actual checkpoints are located at 
the bottom of the exit, and all vehicles exiting the highway 
are stopped subject to those checkpoints.26 Proponents of 
these checkpoints would argue that this complies with 
Edmond because each exiting driver, by seeking to avoid the 
checkpoint, has provided the requisite “quantum of 
individualized suspicion.”27 At least one state supreme court 
has upheld such ruse checkpoints, essentially finding that 
the avoidance of the advertised checkpoint alone is sufficient 
to raise the reasonable suspicion that justifies the stop.28 
 
 24. See, e.g., Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The 
sign was placed a short distance before . . . the exit for . . . a gravel road with no 
services such as gas stations, restaurants, or hotels.”); United States v. Wright, 
512 F.3d 466, 467 (8th Cir. 2008) (“Other than at the campground there are no 
services or signs for services . . . .”); United States v. Valimont, No. 8:12-CR-430, 
2013 WL 1975850, at *1 (D. Neb. May 13, 2013) (“The signs were placed such that 
the only exit available before the supposed checkpoint was a rural exit with no 
advertised services or rest areas.”); Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709 (“[T]he checkpoint 
was set up in an isolated and sparsely populated area offering no services to 
motorists and was conducted on an evening that would otherwise have little 
traffic.”). 
 25. Low, supra note 22, at 959. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47. 
 28. See Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709. The majority pointed to officer testimony 
describing the individual defendant’s driving, which included “‘suddenly 
veer[ing] off onto the off ramp.’” Id. at 710. However, the dissent noted the 
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However, other courts considering these checkpoints have 
reached the opposite result, finding that the Fourth 
Amendment’s individualized suspicion requirement is not 
truly satisfied when each vehicle exiting the freeway is 
stopped.29 
In response to certain challenges, perhaps most notably 
the argument that avoidance of the checkpoint alone is not 
sufficient to raise a reasonable suspicion of drug 
possession,30 two variations to the original ruse narcotics 
checkpoint have come into use and have been upheld by a 
number of state and federal courts. In the first of these 
variations, officers do not stop each car that exits, but instead 
apply a totality of the circumstances approach to determine, 
on an individual basis, which of the exiting cars to detain.31 
Although the decision to leave the highway weighs heavily in 
that totality, some additional factors are also considered to 
buttress a finding of reasonable suspicion.32 Finally, and 
perhaps most commonly, the officers are stationed in a 
location from which they can observe the exiting vehicles, 
and pull over the vehicles after observing the driver commit 
a traffic violation.33 While it is abundantly clear that the 
 
contradiction of invoking a finding of individualized suspicion at a checkpoint 
stopping “all those who exited the highway at a certain point.” Id. at 714 (Denvir 
Stith, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 29. See, e.g., United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(“General profiles that fit large numbers of innocent people do not establish 
reasonable suspicion. . . . Finding a quantum of individualized suspicion only 
after a stop occurs cannot justify the stop itself.”). See also infra text 
accompanying notes 70–71. 
 30. See, e.g., United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“We previously have held that reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop cannot be 
based solely on the fact that a driver exits an interstate after seeing a sign that 
a drug checkpoint lies ahead.”). 
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 81–103. 
 32. See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2006) 
(citing to various factors, in addition to exiting the highway, that support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion). See also infra text accompanying notes 81–98 
(discussing factors the officer in Carpenter observed to support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion). 
 33. See, e.g., Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 Fed. Appx. 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2011); 
2018] RUSE CHECKPOINTS 393 
traffic violation is a pretext for stopping the driver and 
vehicle in this scenario, courts have upheld these seizures 
under Whren.34 
The critical question, with respect to all three variations 
of the ruse drug checkpoint, and most particularly with 
respect to the first two mentioned above, is whether the 
government should be able to establish reasonable suspicion 
exclusively, or in large part, from a threat to violate a 
citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights and the citizen’s decision 
to assert those rights by seeking to avoid an illegal seizure.35 
As stated by Judge Denvir Stith in her dissent from the 
court’s decision in State v. Mack, 
There is something fundamentally unsettling and counter-intuitive 
about labeling as suspicious a person’s conduct in avoiding the 
state’s own unconstitutional conduct. The driver would be put in a 
“Catch-22” of either proceeding down the highway and being 
stopped at an unconstitutional checkpoint, or exiting to avoid it and 
risk being stopped at a ruse checkpoint set up to catch those who 
had exited. The public should not be put to such a choice.36 
Additionally, in the context of the third variety of ruse 
checkpoint, where the officer observes—or claims to have 
observed37—a traffic violation, this Article argues that the 
government should not be permitted to benefit from Whren’s 
 
United States v. Taylor, No. 8:13CR223, 2013 WL 6283819, at *1 (D. Neb. 2013). 
 34. See, e.g., Webb, 456 Fed. Appx. at 380 (“Thus, because a traffic violation 
provides an objective basis for the initial stop . . . the subjective motivations of 
the police in making a stop do not affect the constitutional analysis.” (citing 
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996)). 
 35. Of course, unless a particular driver is well versed in the Court’s 
checkpoint jurisprudence, he very well may not know that the threatened 
checkpoint, had it actually existed, would have been unlawful. 
 36. 66 S.W.2d 706, 717 (2002) (Denvir Stith, J., dissenting). 
 37. See United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 461–62 (8th Cir. 2011) for 
testimony of officer regarding the driver’s failure to signal as inconsistent with 
his statements at the time of stop. Overwhelmingly, the traffic offenses used to 
justify the stops in the ruse checkpoint cases are ones for which there is no 
evidence other than the officer’s word, such as failure to come to a complete stop 
at a stop sign, failure to signal, or improper lane change. See infra notes 105–08 
and accompanying text. 
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shielding of official motives when the opportunity to target 
and observe the driver only presents itself because of official 
misconduct.38 
While the Supreme Court has not been called on to 
determine the constitutionality of ruse drug checkpoints, in 
any of their iterations, the Court has recently ruled on the 
question of whether and under what circumstances police 
may avail themselves of the exigent circumstances exception 
to the warrant requirement,39 when their own conduct 
prompts the exigency.40 The Court, in Kentucky v. King, held 
that a warrantless search of an apartment was reasonable 
where officers, having smelled the odor of marijuana 
escaping the apartment, “banged on . . . the door ‘as loud as 
[they] could,’” announced their identity, and heard sounds 
that led them to believe that the destruction of evidence was 
imminent.41 In considering the scope of “the so-called ‘police-
created exigency’ doctrine” as an exception to the rule 
permitting warrantless searches under exigent 
circumstances, the Court rejected an inquiry into the 
subjective bad faith of the officers in creating the exigency.42 
The Court endorsed, instead, an objective inquiry, holding 
that “the exigent circumstances rule applies when the police 
do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or 
threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.”43 This 
 
 38. See infra Part III. This does not require, as the Court often seeks to avoid, 
an examination of individual subjective motivations, as the signs warning 
motorists of the upcoming drug interdiction checkpoint themselves provide 
objective evidence of the threat to violate Fourth Amendment rights. Further, it 
requires very little imagination to conclude that when officers specifically target 
and stop motorists who have exited the highway to avoid the checkpoint, the 
traffic offenses cited are merely a pretext for the true reason for the stop: a drug 
investigation. 
 39. The exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement was 
firmly recognized by the Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). 
 40. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455 (2011). 
 41. Id. at 456. 
 42. Id. at 461, 464. 
 43. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). 
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Article argues that King is directly analogous to the use of 
ruse drug checkpoints, and that courts considering the 
constitutionality of these checkpoints should be guided by 
the Court’s ruling in King. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief background on 
vehicle checkpoints generally, and ruse drug checkpoints in 
particular. It also surveys the existing case law regarding 
ruse drug checkpoints, and categorizes the various levels of 
individualized suspicion offered to justify these stops: (1) 
avoidance of the threatened checkpoint alone; (2) avoidance 
of the threatened checkpoint as a major factor in a totality 
analysis; and (3) commission of a traffic offense by a driver 
who has avoided the threatened checkpoint. Part II discusses 
the standard of reasonable suspicion as it pertains to these 
checkpoints, and to seizures in general, focusing on 
avoidance of the checkpoint as evidence of suspicious or 
criminal activity. Further, it explores a dichotomy in Fourth 
Amendment protection: where an individual seeks to limit 
exposure to the government in the context of a search, he 
gains or strengthens his constitutional protection. However, 
in the context of a seizure, when an individual seeks to limit 
physical exposure and contact with the government, this 
becomes a basis for diminishing his protection. Part III 
discusses Kentucky v. King in greater detail, further 
developing the analogy between unlawfully created exigent 
circumstances and the use of ruse drug checkpoints. That 
Part concludes that the Court’s ruling in King should govern 
the checkpoint context as well, arguing that even in the third 
category of cases, where a driver has committed a traffic 
offense, Whren should not apply, and the officer should bear 
a heightened burden of demonstrating that the traffic stop is 
not pretextual. 
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I. THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE VEHICLE 
CHECKPOINT 
A. Calling All Cars, Checkpoint Ahead: Suspicionless 
Seizures on American Roadways 
While the history and evolution of vehicle checkpoints 
have been fully developed elsewhere in the scholarly 
literature,44 a brief exposition of the case law and doctrine 
regarding these checkpoints is helpful to understand the 
ruse narcotics checkpoint in its proper context. The Supreme 
Court has permitted the suspicionless seizures of drivers 
through both permanent and temporary checkpoints for a 
variety of purposes. In 1976, the Court in United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte eschewed the usual Fourth Amendment 
norm requiring some level of individualized suspicion to 
justify the seizure of an individual, upholding the 
constitutionality of brief questioning at a permanent 
checkpoint conducted for purposes of immigration 
enforcement.45 The Court’s rationale for upholding the 
checkpoint foreshadows the balancing test formally adopted 
in subsequent checkpoint cases, which requires 
consideration of the governmental purpose and the 
checkpoint’s effectiveness in advancing that purpose, 
weighed against the level of intrusion suffered by the 
individual.46 
 
 44. See, e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, A Suspicionless Search and Seizure 
Quagmire: The Supreme Court Revives the Pretext Doctrine and Creates Another 
Fine Fourth Amendment Mess, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 419, 419 (2007); Deschamps, 
supra note 22; Eustace T. Francis, Combating the Drunk Driving Menace: 
Conditioning the Use of Public Highways on Consent to Sobriety Checkpoint 
Seizure, 59 ALB. L. REV. 599, 603–04 (1995); Johnson, supra note 22, at 782. 
 45. 428 U.S. 543, 556–64 (1976). 
 46. See id. at 562 n.15 (finding the location of the checkpoint reasonable in 
light of the high number of apprehensions and the relatively light flow of 
legitimate traffic between San Diego and Los Angeles). The Court set out the 
factors used to assess the constitutionality of a seizure in Brown v. Texas, 
requiring courts to weigh “the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, 
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Thus, the Court began its analysis by noting the large 
numbers of illegal immigrants within the country and the 
difficulties of detecting unlawful entries, ultimately 
concluding that “[i]nterdicting the flow of illegal 
entrants . . . poses formidable law enforcement problems.”47 
The Court continued by examining the particular 
characteristics of permanent checkpoints, designed by the 
Border Patrol to ensure effectiveness, and by stating that the 
particular checkpoint at issue had exposed deportable 
individuals within 0.12% of stopped vehicles, which would 
have resulted in over 33,000 such apprehensions over an 
annual period at a similar rate.48 
In concluding that seizures at such checkpoints are 
permitted in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the Court 
emphasized that these types of programs are “necessary” and 
“most important,” and that a requirement of individualized 
suspicion would be “impractical.”49 On balance, the Court 
viewed the intrusion upon the individual as being “quite 
limited.”50 The Court supported this conclusion with a 
number of assertions. First, the intrusion itself generally 
involved only “a brief question or two and possibly the 
production of a document . . . .”51 Second, the Court reasoned 
that the permanent nature of the checkpoint, as well as the 
lack of individual official discretion in operating the 
checkpoint, lessened the gravity of the intrusion because 
motorists would not be taken by surprise, nor would they be 
 
the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of 
the interference with individual liberty.” 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979). 
 47. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 551–52. 
 48. See id. at 554. 
 49. Id. at 556–57. 
 50. Id. at 557. 
 51. Id. at 558 (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 
(1975)). The Court based its assessment of intrusiveness on the initial checkpoint 
seizure, rather than on any subsequent questioning, finding that referral to a 
secondary area for further inspection did not require the same level of cause as a 
roving stop, and could constitutionally be “made largely on the basis of apparent 
Mexican ancestry . . . .” Id. at 563. 
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subjected to “abusive or harassing stops.”52 
In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the Court 
turned its attention from illegal immigration to highway 
sobriety.53 Again, balancing the importance of the 
governmental interest served by the checkpoint and its 
effectiveness in furthering that interest against the 
“objective” and “subjective” intrusion on drivers, the Court 
upheld the program.54 In conducting its balancing, the Court 
found the “magnitude of the drunk driving problem” to be 
beyond dispute, and this particular checkpoint, as well as 
other similar ones, to have a hit rate at or above one 
percent—making these checkpoints considerably more 
effective than the one upheld in Martinez-Fuerte.55 
As for the objective intrusiveness of the checkpoint, the 
Court found the intrusion of a brief stop for a sobriety check 
to be “slight.”56 Subjectively speaking, the Court found this 
checkpoint, although a temporary one, “indistinguishable” 
from the permanent checkpoint approved in Martinez-
Fuerte, contrasting it with roving-patrol stops.57 The Court 
 
 52. Id. at 559. The Court has noted the far more intrusive nature of the roving 
patrol stop, stating, “[r]oving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled 
roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the 
motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, . . . and he is much less 
likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.” United States v. Ortiz, 422 
U.S. 891, 894–95 (1975). Of course, the Court’s description of the roving patrol 
and its effect on the surprised motorist sounds precisely like the stops conducted 
on remote roadways pursuant to the ruse checkpoints. 
 53. See 496 U.S. 444, 444 (1990). 
 54. See id. at 455. As in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court here focused on the initial 
stop of the vehicle at the checkpoint, only noting that “[d]etention of particular 
motorists for more extensive field sobriety testing may require satisfaction of an 
individualized suspicion standard.” Id. at 451. 
 55. Id. at 451–55. 
 56. Id. at 451–52. 
 57. Id. at 452–53. This characterization was vigorously contested by Justice 
Stevens in dissent: “In my opinion, unannounced investigatory seizures are, 
particularly when they take place at night, the hallmark of regimes far different 
from ours; the surprise intrusion upon individual liberty is not minimal.” Id. at 
468–69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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again emphasized the limit on unfettered officer discretion 
with respect to the operation of the checkpoint, provided by 
the guidelines.58 
Previously, in Delaware v. Prouse, the Court also 
considered the validity of a checkpoint program, and, 
although that particular program was invalidated because of 
the lack of guidelines to curb individual discretion, the Court 
had suggested approval of another purpose for vehicle 
checkpoints: the license and registration check.59 Thus, by 
the time the Court was faced with deciding the 
constitutionality of a checkpoint designed and operating 
primarily for the purpose of interdicting illegal drugs, it had 
already approved of checkpoints serving the interests of 
immigration enforcement and highway safety. And, while 
the Court in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond made clear “that 
traffic in illegal narcotics creates social harms of the first 
magnitude,”60 and the challenged checkpoint also resulted in 
similarly brief detentions when compared to those 
experienced by motorists in its previous checkpoint cases,61 
the Court took a different course. 
The Court distinguished the checkpoint at issue in 
Edmond from the earlier approved checkpoints, reasoning 
that while the immigration checkpoint had an obvious 
connection to the country’s interest in maintaining the 
integrity of its borders, and the highway safety checkpoint 
had a more direct connection to the roadways and sought to 
address a more immediate threat to life and limb, the drug 
 
 58. Id. at 452–53 (“Here, checkpoints are selected pursuant to guidelines, and 
uniformed officers stop every vehicle.”). 
 59. 440 U.S. 648, 658, (1979) (“[T]he State[] [has] a vital interest in ensuring 
that only those qualified to do so are permitted to operate motor vehicles, that 
these vehicles are fit for safe operation, and hence that licensing, registration, 
and vehicle inspection requirements are being observed.”). 
 60. 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000). 
 61. Id. at 35 (“The city agreed . . . to operate the checkpoints in such a way as 
to ensure that the total duration of each stop, absent reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause, would be five minutes or less.”). 
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interdiction checkpoint was primarily aimed at 
“pursu[ing] . . . general crime control ends.”62 For such a 
purpose, the Court was loath to suspend the usual Fourth 
Amendment requirement of individualized suspicion, noting 
that its failure to do so “would do little to prevent such 
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.”63 
Nonetheless, the Court did not, by its language, forbid all 
checkpoints with the primary purpose of discovering illegal 
narcotics, but held that stops aimed at uncovering such 
activity required individualized suspicion.64 Just how much 
individualized suspicion would be required to justify a drug 
interdiction checkpoint, however, was not specified by the 
Court,65 and this lack of specificity paved the way for police 
departments to develop a new type of checkpoint: the ruse 
narcotics checkpoint. 
B. Calling All Cars, Checkpoint Ahead: Ruse Narcotics 
Checkpoints 
As previously described,66 the ruse checkpoints operate 
by deceiving motorists traveling along a highway into 
believing that a drug interdiction checkpoint is being 
conducted some ways ahead, although, of course, not before 
an opportunity to exit the highway. It is not unreasonable to 
assume that some or even many of the motorists would avail 
themselves of the exit in order to avoid the advertised 
checkpoint, whether or not they have anything to hide.67 In 
 
 62. Id. at 43. 
 63. Id. at 42. The Court also rejected the checkpoint despite its lawful 
secondary purposes of checking license and registration, and looking for signs of 
impairment. Id. at 46–47. 
 64. Id. at 47. 
 65. The Court simply held that “[w]hen law enforcement authorities pursue 
primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoint such as here, however, 
stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized suspicion.” Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 66. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
 67. In fact, the court in State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002), found 
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the first-generation model of the ruse checkpoint,68 however, 
the assumption seems to be that most drivers who choose to 
exit the highway are seeking to avoid detection of 
wrongdoing, and thus, when they are stopped at the actual 
checkpoint, at the bottom of the exit ramp, their act of exiting 
has provided the “quantum of individualized suspicion” 
needed to satisfy Edmond.69 
Courts generally have not approved this model of the 
ruse checkpoint,70 primarily because stopping each car that 
exits, even assuming that a significant portion of those 
drivers are seeking to avoid the checkpoint, simply does not 
comport with a requirement of suspicion individually 
tailored to each car and driver. As stated by the Eighth 
Circuit in United States v. Yousif, 
General profiles that fit large numbers of innocent people do not 
establish reasonable suspicion. Without first stopping the vehicles 
and questioning the drivers, the police had no way to determine why 
any particular vehicles were exiting at the Sugar Tree Road ramp. 
Finding a quantum of individualized suspicion only after a stop 
occurs cannot justify the stop itself.71 
That argument notwithstanding, the Supreme Court of 
Missouri upheld such a checkpoint, and reversed the 
 
this assumption to be reasonable due to the “significant efforts to reduce the 
legitimate reasons for taking the exit.” 
 68. See Low, supra note 22, at 959. 
 69. Even, assuming arguendo, that Edmond might be satisfied, there is a 
strong argument that the ruse checkpoint would not satisfy the Brown v. Texas 
test. See supra note 46. As one commentator argues, these “checkpoints are more 
intrusive than the other checkpoints that have been considered by courts in the 
past. Not only are drivers taken by complete surprise at such stops . . . these 
drivers are also deliberately deceived into thinking that the checkpoint is set up 
at a different location.” Johnson, supra note 22, at 791–92. 
 70. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 71. 308 F.3d 820, 828 (8th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). The Sugar Tree Road 
exit (off of Interstate 44 in Phelps County, Missouri) at issue in Yousif was also 
the exit used in the ruse checkpoint schemes in at least three other cases: United 
States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 
359 F.3d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004); and United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 
1006 (8th Cir. 2004). 
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Defendant’s motion to suppress, finding it “reasonable to 
conclude that drivers with drugs would ‘take the bait’ and 
exit . . . to avoid being questioned at the next exit.”72 The 
court continued by noting that the checkpoint was set up at 
a time and location to minimize “legitimate reasons for 
taking the exit” and also noted the that such deceptive tactics 
are effective, all of which bolstered a finding of 
reasonableness.73 
To avoid the objection raised in Yousif, the ruse 
checkpoint evolved in its operation. If stopping each car 
would run afoul of Edmond’s requirement of individualized 
suspicion, then stopping only those cars whose drivers did in 
fact exhibit distinctively suspicious behavior would, in 
theory, pass constitutional muster, as long as such behavior 
attained the level of reasonable suspicion required for a 
temporary investigative stop. Thus, rather than having an 
actual checkpoint at the bottom of the exit ramp, officers 
place themselves where they can observe the cars that take 
the exit after having seen the ruse sign, and execute a stop 
only after observing additional suspicious behavior.74 
 
 72. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709. 
 73. Id. The court did allow for the possibility that the evasive behavior alone 
might not be enough to justify the stop, stating, however, that “even if the 
deceptive drug checkpoint scheme did not alone constitute ‘individualized 
suspicion,’ defendant’s particular conduct in exiting at the checkpoint must also 
be considered.” Id. Thus, the court was willing to consider the defendant’s sudden 
veering onto the ramp as further evidence of suspicion. Id. at 710. As noted by 
the dissent, however, because all motorists were being stopped, this “after-the-
fact” justification was not in fact the basis for the defendant’s being stopped. Id. 
at 720 (Denvir Stith, J., dissenting). The majority also relied on United States v. 
Brugal, 209 F.3d 353 (4th Cir. 2000), for the proposition that avoidance of a ruse 
checkpoint furnishes reasonable suspicion. Mack, 66 S.W.3d at 709. The majority 
did note, however, that Brugal involved a challenge to the continued detention of 
the motorist, but did not directly address the initial roadblock stopping the 
exiting drivers. Id. at 709 n.1. 
 74. One author describes these “modified ruse drug checkpoints” as differing 
from the first-generation checkpoint in two ways: first, not all drivers are stopped 
at the exit; and second, officers are also located on the interstate (as opposed to 
only at the bottom of the exit ramp) in order to observe suspicious behavior, or a 
traffic violation, in the act of exiting the interstate itself. Low, supra note 22, at 
965. 
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The standard of reasonable suspicion that justifies a 
temporary stop in the ruse checkpoint context will be more 
thoroughly explored below,75 but for purposes of this Part, it 
suffices to say that reasonable suspicion is established when 
“a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be 
afoot.”76 This conclusion, however, cannot be based merely on 
an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but 
[on] specific reasonable inferences” drawn from the officer’s 
experience.77 Similarly to the more demanding standard of 
probable cause,78 a determination of sufficiency of the 
information is based on an analysis of the “totality of the 
circumstances.”79 Thus, if exiting the highway upon seeing 
the ruse narcotics checkpoint sign is not enough to establish 
reasonable suspicion of drug possession or trafficking80—if it 
 
 75. See infra Section II.A. 
 76. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 77. Id. at 27. 
 78. The Court, in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983), defined probable 
cause as a “fair probability” of criminal activity, and reaffirmed the “totality-of-
the-circumstances analysis” as the proper approach to determinations of probable 
cause. The Court has compared reasonable suspicion to probable cause by 
describing the “level of suspicion required for a Terry stop [as] obviously less 
demanding than that for probable cause . . . .” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 
1, 7 (1989). 
 79. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1990) (holding that the same 
totality approach as proscribed by the Court in Gates is applicable to the context 
of reasonable suspicion as well, taking into account “the lesser showing required 
to meet that standard.”). 
 80. But see State v. Rose, No. 29,388, 2011 WL 193537, at *5 (N.M. Ct. App. 
2011). In Rose, the New Mexico Court of Appeals did not address the legality of 
the ruse checkpoint as an investigatory method, stating that the issue was not 
properly preserved below. Id. at *3–4 . The Defendant was stopped after 
executing an illegal u-turn to avoid the advertised checkpoint, and tried, on 
appeal, to raise the argument that such a checkpoint (had it existed) would have 
been unlawful under Edmond, and that the placement of the ruse essentially 
forced drivers seeking to avoid the unlawful checkpoint to make an illegal u-turn. 
Id. at *1–4. While not ruling on the use of the ruse, the court nonetheless upheld 
the seizure, stating “where a driver engages in conduct that indicates he is 
attempting to evade a narcotics checkpoint, an officer may form a reasonable 
suspicion that the driver is in possession of narcotics.” Id. at *4 (citing State v. 
Anaya, 2009-NMSC-043, 147 N.M. 100, 217 P.3d 586 (2009) (holding that 
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were, then all exiting drivers could be lawfully detained—the 
critical question becomes just how much more is needed to 
provide the required level of suspicion. 
The next generation of ruse checkpoint, briefly discussed 
here, differs from the scenario described directly above only 
in that other factors are considered, in addition to the 
driver’s choice to exit the highway, to justify the detention of 
some, but not all, exiting drivers, based on the totality of 
circumstances. The Eighth Circuit case of United States v. 
Carpenter once again involved the ruse checkpoint at the 
Sugar Tree Road exit on Highway 44 in Phelps County, 
Missouri.81 The officer, Deputy Rightnowar, in a marked car, 
was placed where he could observe “nonlocal traffic” and “get 
reason to stop them.”82 According to Carpenter, he had exited 
in search of a gas station because he was low on fuel, but in 
doing so, he piqued the interest of the waiting officer who 
decided to follow the Chevrolet Blazer because it “‘just didn’t 
look right for the area.’”83 According to Carpenter, once he 
realized there was no service station at this exit, he observed 
the patrol car through his rear-view mirror, and, fearing a 
trap, executed a U-turn and pulled over to the side of the 
road.84 Meanwhile, Rightnowar observed Carpenter’s vehicle 
parked on the side of the road and pulled in behind him, 
activating his lights.85 
In the ensuing conversation between the two, Carpenter 
explained that he was traveling in a rental vehicle between 
Austin, Texas, and New York, and offered his reason for 
 
avoidance of a sobriety checkpoint supports a reasonable suspicion that the driver 
is intoxicated)). 
 81. 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 82. Id. The officer specified that he was focused on cars that were not familiar 
to him, or those with license plates from other states. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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leaving the highway.86 However, this did not quell 
Rightnowar’s suspicion, as he observed the gas tank to be 
one-quarter full.87 Further, although the sign at the Sugar 
Tree Road exit indicated a motel and campground, it did not 
indicate other services, as were available at other exits.88 
Adding to his suspicion, Rightnowar found Carpenter to 
appear nervous, observing “an artery in his neck pulsing.”89 
At this point, Rightnowar took possession of Carpenter’s 
license and rental documents for approximately five 
minutes, observing that the Blazer had been rented not in 
Austin, but in El Paso.90 When the officer returned from his 
patrol car, he requested consent to search some boxes in the 
car, which Carpenter claimed contained tile.91 When 
Carpenter refused, Rightnowar ordered Carpenter out of the 
vehicle, patted him down for weapons, told him that he 
believed Carpenter had drugs in his vehicle, and called a 
nearby officer with a narcotics detection dog.92 The dog 
subsequently alerted the officers to drugs, and the ensuing 
search revealed cocaine in the boxes.93 
Interestingly, the district court found Carpenter had 
been seized in the absence of reasonable suspicion, relying 
primarily on the argument that Carpenter’s act of exiting the 
highway was not enough, alone, to support the seizure.94 The 
district court did not definitively ascertain the point of 
seizure, finding instead that Carpenter had been seized 
either when the officer took his documents to his patrol car, 
 
 86. Id. at 983–84. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 984. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 984–85. 
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or once the officer asked him to exit his vehicle.95 The Eighth 
Circuit, however, found that Carpenter was not seized until 
the latter event.96 By pushing forward the point of seizure, 
the court could now include the information gained by 
Rightnowar after he took Carpenter’s license and rental 
papers to justify the subsequent seizure, which occurred, 
according to the Eighth Circuit, once Rightnowar informed 
Carpenter of his suspicion, asked him to exit his car, and 
conducted a weapons frisk. 
The court summarized the circumstances supporting a 
finding of reasonable suspicion, relying heavily on the 
following facts: (1) Carpenter exited the highway 
immediately after the checkpoint sign, and parked on the 
side of the road “for no apparent reason”; (2) he claimed to 
have exited—at an exit with no services—in search of a gas 
station, even though his gas tank was one-quarter full; (3) 
when questioned, he appeared nervous; and (4) although he 
claimed to be driving from Austin, his vehicle was in fact 
rented in El Paso, “a known source city for drugs.”97 Although 
the court noted that some innocent drivers may do the very 
things Carpenter did, it ultimately found the circumstances 
were “sufficiently unusual and suspicious that they 
eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers, and 
provide reasonable suspicion to justify the brief detention of 
Carpenter . . . .”98 Of course, had the court found Carpenter 
was seized when Rightnowar took his license and paperwork, 
the discrepancy between the stated origin of travel and the 
location of the rental would not have played any role in 
establishing suspicion, and it is highly questionable whether, 
 
 95. Id. at 985 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 987. The fourth factor seemed to play a major role in the court’s 
analysis: “[t]his sort of discrepancy between documents and a driver’s 
explanation is a legitimate basis for suspicion, particularly where a reasonable 
officer could infer that Carpenter’s explanation was an effort to distance himself 
from a known source city for drugs.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 98. Id. 
2018] RUSE CHECKPOINTS 407 
without that fact, the seizure would have withstood 
constitutional scrutiny. 
As a comparison, the Tenth Circuit, in United States v. 
Neff, although agreeing with the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
that the driver’s choice to exit after the decoy sign is a highly 
relevant fact in assessing reasonable suspicion, emphasized 
the importance of “additional suspicious circumstances or 
independently evasive behavior to justify” an investigative 
stop.99 In this particular case, the court concluded that such 
additional circumstances did not support a finding of 
reasonable suspicion.100 The additional factors considered by 
the court in its analysis included the following facts: (1) Neff 
(the driver) exited the highway onto a gravel road after the 
checkpoint sign; (2) he pulled into and stopped on a driveway; 
(3) when he observed the officer who had been tailing him, 
he appeared “startled,” then “backed out of the driveway as 
if to turn around”; and (4) his vehicle plates were registered 
to a neighboring county.101 In its analysis, the court noted 
that there was no evidence that Neff engaged in any erratic 
driving that would add to the suspicion,102 and, critically, 
that Neff had not committed any traffic violations observed 
by the officer.103 
This leads us to the next, and most common, variant of 
the ruse checkpoint case: where drivers who exit after the 
checkpoint sign are not stopped based on reasonable 
suspicion of drug trafficking, but are stopped because of an 
 
 99. United States v. Neff, 681 F.3d 1134, 1142–43 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 100. Id. at 1143. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 1142. The court discussed the Supreme Court decision of Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000), and its holding that “an individual’s 
‘unprovoked flight upon noticing the police’ and ‘nervous, evasive behavior’ are 
relevant factors in determining reasonable suspicion for a brief investigatory 
stop. Neff, 681 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124). For a more 
thorough discussion of Wardlow and its role in the reasonable suspicion analysis 
in the ruse checkpoint context, see infra Part II. 
 103. Neff, 681 F.3d at 1143. 
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observed traffic violation.104 As the previously discussed 
cases illustrate, officers who conduct investigative stops 
relying on observed factors to support a finding of reasonable 
suspicion may later have those stops deemed unlawful, if a 
court decides those factors to be insufficient. This 
determination may, in turn, depend on when a court decides 
the seizure actually occurred. With so much uncertainty, it 
is not surprising that this variant of the ruse narcotics 
checkpoint is frequently encountered, and often (but not 
always) proves successful. It is much easier to avoid a Fourth 
Amendment violation, and the outcome is more predictable, 
when the officer supports the stop with testimony that he 
observed the driver commit a traffic violation, rather than 
having to establish a number of suspicious circumstances 
that must survive a court’s totality analysis. 
Moreover, many of the cases surveyed by this author 
involve traffic offenses without independently verifiable 
proof, such as a reading on a radar gun to establish a 
speeding violation.105 Instead, the violations at issue in these 
cases are often proved only through an officer’s observation 
and later, his testimony, that the driver failed to comply with 
the traffic code. For example, the drivers in these cases were 
pulled over due to the officer’s observation of a stop-sign 
 
 104. Although targeted because they have exited the highway, and thus, they 
are in fact suspected of drug trafficking, the stops of these drivers are justified on 
the basis of their having committed a traffic violation. In one case included in this 
category of checkpoint cases, the passenger of the exiting vehicle discarded an 
object from the vehicle window, and therefore, the stop was based on a littering, 
rather than traffic, violation. Roth v. Green, 466 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2006). 
The object turned out to be a marijuana pipe. Id. 
 105. It is possible that a traffic violation could be recorded by the patrol car’s 
video, which is what occurred in United States v. Valimont, No. 8:12-CR-430, 
2013 WL 1975850, at *3 (D. Neb. May 13, 2013). Although the camera recorded 
the defendant’s failure to use his signal, the officer failed to turn on the 
microphone. Id. at *3. However, most of the cases surveyed by the author did not 
mention video evidence of the purported traffic violations, or, if there was 
available video footage, as in United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 472 (8th Cir. 
2008), the camera was not activated until after the officer witnessed the violation 
and decided to execute a stop. See also United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 
461 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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violation,106 a signal violation,107 or a lane violation.108 One 
such case exemplifies how these traps are set up, and how 
courts typically uphold the seizures that occur. In United 
States v. Johnson, various police departments in a Texas 
county operated a typical ruse checkpoint—setting up a 
cautionary sign warning of an upcoming narcotics checkpoint 
less than a mile away from an exit located in, as is typical, a 
“remote area where there are no services or facilities . . . and 
[which] does not lead to any other major highway.”109 In 
addition, the exit used to bait the unsuspecting drivers was 
located approximately two miles past a well-lit exit with an 
abundance of services, restaurants, and places of lodging.”110 
Only those drivers who committed a traffic violation were 
stopped by officers, but the chosen location was not only 
typical in its remoteness, but also ideal for creating ample 
opportunities for traffic violations to occur.111 As described 
by the court: 
It is somewhat difficult for an individual unfamiliar with the exit to 
avoid committing a traffic violation. The speed limit quickly drops 
from 65 miles per hour to 25 miles per hour and there are no lights 
at the exit. [The road] is a two-lane road divided by a yellow 
centerline. It is easy to cross the centerline when entering [the road] 
from the . . . exit ramp, since there is only a short break in the 
centerline to allow entry into the lane of travel. Crossing the yellow 
centerline is a traffic offense under Texas law.112 
 
 106. United States v. Chavez Loya, 528 F.3d 546, 549 (8th Cir. 2008); Wright, 
512 F.3d at 467; United States v. Williams, 359 F.3d 1019, 1020 (8th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Martinez, 358 F.3d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 107. Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 F. App’x. 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2011); Prokupek, 632 
F.3d at 461; United States v. Wendt, 465 F.3d 814, 815 (7th Cir. 2006); Valimont, 
2013 WL 1975850, at *1. 
 108. United States v. Grier, 127 F. App’x. 712, 713 (5th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Johnson, 59 M.J. 666, 669 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2003). 
 109. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 668. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
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The court continued by finding it “undisputed” that the 
officers established probable cause to stop drivers by 
observing the violations, and also that it was “undisputed 
that the real purpose of the stops was not to cite motorists 
for minor traffic violations, but to interdict illicit drugs on a 
known drug-trafficking route.”113 In fact, while close to one-
third of the exiting drivers were stopped for minor violations, 
not one citation was issued during the checkpoint’s 
operation.114 Johnson was pulled over, rather predictably, for 
crossing the center while entering the road, after having 
exited the interstate.115 He then consented to the search of 
his vehicle, resulting in the discovery of marijuana.116 
The court engaged in a fairly thorough exposition of the 
relevant case law, finding these facts “clearly 
distinguishable” from both Edmond117 and the Eighth 
Circuit case of United States v. Yousif,118 which the 
defendant relied on for the very simple reason that, unlike 
both Edmond and Yousif, there was no actual checkpoint or 
roadblock stopping all passing motorists, and only those who 
committed a violation were detained.119 While the purpose, 
as in Edmond, may have been drug interdiction, and the use 
of deception may have been identical to that used in 
Yousif,120 the court concluded that “[t]he stop of a motor 
vehicle based on an observed violation of a traffic law is a 
stop based upon probable cause and is, therefore, reasonable 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 668–69. 
 115. See id. at 669. 
 116. Id. 
 117. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). See supra notes 60–
64 and accompanying text. 
 118. 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2003). See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying 
text. 
 119. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 671–73. 
 120. Id. at 672. 
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under the Fourth Amendment.”121 And so, even as the court 
found that the “traffic offenses were simply a pretext for 
[officers’] real motivation of intercepting illicit narcotics in 
the vehicles of those who might be attempting to evade the 
nonexistent drug checkpoint,”122 the court cited to Whren v. 
United States,123 for its holding that as long as the seizure is 
objectively justified, the officer’s state of mind or true 
motivation has no real relevance.124 Further, while the traffic 
stop would not have justified the subsequent search of the 
vehicle, Johnson’s consent was all the justification needed.125 
While the exit used to snare suspected drug traffickers 
in Johnson created a strong likelihood that an unwitting 
driver would commit a traffic violation, such as the lane 
violation committed in that case, the types of violations 
frequently seen in these ruse checkpoint cases raise the 
possibility of police fabrication—or, at the very least, a 
contested version of the facts leading to conflicting 
testimonies of officers and defendants at suppression 
 
 121. Id. at 673 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 124. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 673. See also United States v. Williams, 359 F.3d 
1019, 1021 (8th Cir. 2004) (relying on Whren to uphold objectively justified 
seizures, regardless of “a law enforcement officer’s ulterior motives.”). 
 125. Johnson, 59 M.J. at 673. Of course, once the officer conducts the initial 
stop of a driver, he will likely seek to obtain consent to search the vehicle. In 
many of the cases surveyed here, the subsequent searches were indeed based on 
consent. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 512 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Wendt, 465 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Grier, 
127 F. App’x. 712, 713 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Valimont, No. 8:12-CR-
430, 2013 WL 1975850, at *2 (D. Neb. May 13, 2013). Alternatively, the detained 
motorist may exhibit additional indicia of suspicion, or make incriminating 
statements that can provide an officer with probable cause to search. See, e.g., 
Webb v. Arbuckle, 456 F. App’x. 374, 384 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that officers did 
not act unreasonably in searching the entire car of a doctor who informed the 
officers that she “might be in possession of controlled substances and was 
uncertain what substances she had in the car.”). Or, a drug detection canine 
available at the scene may alert to the presence of contraband, providing the 
necessary probable cause to search. See United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 
461 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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hearings. When there is no proof of the violation other than 
the officer’s observation, judges and magistrates must base 
their factual conclusions on their assessments of credibility. 
For example, in United States v. Wendt, two officers—
one (Officer Parkinson) stationed on an interstate overpass 
and using binoculars, and the other (Officer Boerm) 
stationed at the top of the exit ramp—separately observed 
the defendant make two distinct sets of traffic offenses: 
crossing two lanes in order to take the ruse exit without 
signaling, and straddling the roadway’s center line after 
having exited.126 The court stated, “[a]s expected, Wendt’s 
version of the facts differ [sic].”127 The defendant claimed he 
had only crossed through one lane in order to exit the 
interstate, used his signal, and upon exiting, remained in the 
proper lane.128 Based on his own observations and the 
information he received from Parkinson, Boerm stopped 
Wendt, obtained consent to search the vehicle, and 
discovered 19.6 kilograms of cocaine.129 
However, it was not until Wendt was in custody that 
Boerm prepared a written warning, and although he had 
originally indicated the time on the warning as 13:40, he 
later corrected it to state 15:40.130 In addition, Wendt pointed 
to several other facts in order to call the officers’ credibility 
into question: in his testimony, Officer Parkinson “‘refus[ed] 
to acknowledge that he worked as part of a drug interdiction 
detain’ [sic] and instead characterized his assignment as 
‘conducting traffic stops.’”131 However, Parkinson, if he was 
indeed searching for traffic violations, was doing so without 
a radar gun, seemed to target vehicles from out-of-state, and 
 
 126. Wendt, 465 F.3d at 815. 
 127. Id. at 816 (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. Officer Boerm indicated that he often confused the two numbers in 
military time. Id. 
 131. Id. at 817. 
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testified that, although he observed the failure to signal, he 
could not see the vehicle’s license plate.132 On appeal, the 
court found these inconsistencies “minor and unpersuasive” 
and exhibited the usual deference to the trial judge in 
assessing credibility.133 
Although in most of the surveyed cases the court found 
the police version of events more credible, United States v. 
Prokupk illustrates an instance where the appellate court 
concluded that the inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony 
were too great to overlook, and thus overturned the district 
court’s finding as clearly erroneous.134 After Ronald 
Prokupek exited the interstate following the ruse checkpoint 
sign and turned onto a local road, Trooper Estwick stopped 
Prokupek’s vehicle.135 As indicated by the officer’s dashboard 
camera, which had been activated immediately after the 
traffic stop, Estwick explained that Prokupek failed to signal 
his exit from the interstate, but that he properly used his 
signal upon turning onto the county road at the bottom of the 
exit ramp.136 However, at the suppression hearing, Estwick 
testified that stop was based on probable cause that 
Prokupek failed to signal his turn onto the county road.137 
When pressed by defense counsel with respect to the 
inconsistency between his initial statement to Prokupek at 
the time of the stop and his testimony, Estwick repeated 
several times simply that Prokupek “failed to signal” and 
admitted that he did not (and, in fact, could not) actually see 
him exit the interstate.138 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. The trial judge’s credibility determination would need to be clearly 
erroneous in order to be overturned on appeal. Id. 
 134. 632 F.3d 460, 463 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 135. Id. at 461. 
 136. Id. During the traffic stop, a narcotics dog indicated the presence of what 
turned out to be 151 grams of methamphetamine. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
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The magistrate judge presiding over the suppression 
hearing found Estwick’s testimony at that hearing to be 
credible, despite the inconsistency.139 However, upon de novo 
review, the district court adopted a broader finding that 
effectively rendered the inconsistency of little import, finding 
that, “‘Prokupek failed to [signal] at one of the two described 
places.’”140 On appeal, in light of the fact that Estwick had 
not been located in a position to view Prokupek’s exit from 
the interstate, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the 
district court for clarification of its finding.141 The district 
court supplemented its earlier finding, acknowledging the 
inconsistency between Estwick’s testimony and his 
contemporaneous statement at the traffic stop, while 
ultimately concluding that the traffic stop statement was “an 
unintentional misstatement” and that Prokupek had, in fact, 
failed to signal his turn onto the county road.142 
The Eighth Circuit characterized the district court’s 
finding as an “attempt[] to dismiss the contradiction” and 
found “no evidence in the record that supports this finding,” 
noting that Estwick himself offered no explanation for the 
inconsistency in his statements when cross-examined by 
defense counsel.143 The Eighth Circuit vacated the 
convictions, stating: 
Because Trooper Eswtick’s testimony at the hearing is so clearly 
and affirmatively contradicted by his own statement at the time of 
the events, in the absence of any explanation for this contradiction 
that is supported by the record, we conclude that Trooper Eswtick’s 
after-the-fact testimony at the suppression hearing is “implausible 
on its face,” and we are left with the “firm and definite conviction 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (emphasis added). The district court denied the suppression motions 
of Prokupek and his passenger, and entered their conditional guilty pleas, after 
which Prokupek and his passenger appealed the court’s denial of their 
suppression motions. Id. at 461–62. 
 141. Id. at 462. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 463. 
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that a mistake has been made . . . .”144 
Thus, because the Eighth Circuit found that the district 
court’s crediting of Estwick’s suppression hearing testimony 
was clearly erroneous, and because the government had no 
other basis for justifying the traffic stop, the Eighth Circuit 
concluded that the traffic stop constituted an illegal seizure, 
and that the drugs that had been found pursuant to that stop 
were inadmissible as fruit of that illegality.145 
While Prokupek provides an example where ultimately, 
the officer’s proffered justification for the traffic stop leading 
to the discovery of narcotics was disbelieved, it is important 
to note that, before the Eighth Circuit rendered its decision, 
two levels of judicial review, by the magistrate and district 
court judges, all but ignored the very real possibility that 
Trooper Estwick fabricated the probable cause to conduct the 
traffic stop. Prokupek also highlights why the third 
generation of ruse checkpoint stops—those based on traffic 
offenses allegedly committed by drivers upon exiting after 
seeing the checkpoint sign—is the most common and also 
potentially the most problematic because of the ease with 
which officers can conduct traffic stops, either based on 
actual or fabricated violations of the traffic code. The next 
Part of this Article, however, turns once more to the issue at 
the heart of the ruse checkpoint: the suspicion generated by 
the driver who “take[s] the bait”146 and chooses to exit the 
highway, only to drive right into that which he sought to 
avoid. 
 
 144. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 145. Id. 
 146. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 709 (Mo. 2002). 
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II. TAKING THE ROAD LESS TRAVELED: ADVERTISING YOUR 
GUILT OR ASSERTING YOUR RIGHTS? 
A. Avoiding a Checkpoint as an Assertion of the Right to Be 
Free of Unreasonable Seizures 
As briefly mentioned above,147 Terry v. Ohio authorized 
police to conduct temporary investigative stops based on 
reasonable suspicion—a lesser standard than the probable 
cause required for an arrest.148 While Terry laid the 
groundwork for the use of the ruse checkpoint as a tool in 
fighting drug trafficking, Illinois v. Wardlow provided the 
cornerstone supporting the rationale used to justify this 
particular method of ensnaring unwitting drivers.149 In 
Wardlow, the Court eschewed a per se rule respecting flight 
and its role in generating the suspicion necessary to support 
an investigative stop, but nevertheless upheld a stop as 
properly based on reasonable suspicion considering two 
factors alone: the defendant’s “presence in an area of heavy 
narcotics trafficking” and the defendant’s “unprovoked 
flight” from police.150 Extrapolating Wardlow’s holding to the 
ruse checkpoint scenario, one can at first glance understand 
the logic underpinning even the first-generation ruse 
checkpoint.151 The drivers are originally located on an 
interstate (an area with a high potential for drug trafficking) 
and, upon being notified of a police presence ahead (the ruse), 
exit the highway in order to avoid contact with law 
enforcement.152 
 
 147. See supra note 76. 
 148. 392 U.S. 1, 33, 37 (1968). 
 149. See 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
 150. Id. at 124. In Wardlow, two officers driving as a part of a four-car caravan 
through an area known for drug trafficking spotted the defendant standing near 
a building holding an opaque bag. Id. at 121–22. As the caravan passed the 
building, the defendant “looked in the direction of the officers and fled.” Id. 
 151. See supra text accompanying notes 25–26. 
 152. While it is a stretch to classify an entire interstate as a high-crime area, 
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However, on closer inspection, one can also see why most 
courts rejected the first-generation ruse checkpoint, 
requiring more factors to be added to the mix before 
declaring the standard of reasonable suspicion to be met. 
First, it is problematic to classify an interstate as an area 
known for drug trafficking. Any product that is being 
transported from one location to another over large distances 
will likely traverse our nation’s interstates, whether that 
product is an illegal substance or produce being delivered to 
a supermarket chain. Further, while drug traffickers may, of 
necessity, use the interstate system, so too do those 
commuting to work on a daily basis and those heading to 
recreational activities or a long overdue family vacation. In 
other words, the interstates are used too heavily and for too 
many purposes to be properly classified as high-crime areas. 
More critical, however, is an examination of what 
constitutes “unprovoked flight.” The Court, in Wardlow, 
noted the relevance of “nervous, evasive behavior [as] a 
pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.”153 The 
Court continued by describing “[h]eadlong flight—wherever 
it occurs—[as] the consummate act of evasion . . . .”154 
 
as contemplated in Wardlow, the court in United States v. Yousif noted that the 
Sugar Tree Road exit was selected as the ruse checkpoint exit partly “because 
law enforcement officers believed that I-44 was a commonly used route for 
transporting drugs . . . .” 308 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 2002). Exiting the highway 
could conceivably serve as evidence of the second factor relied on by the Wardlow 
court: unprovoked flight. See Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. One article has classified 
a driver’s choice to exit the highway as follows: “When a drug courier chooses to 
exit the interstate in order to avoid what appears to be an upcoming narcotics 
checkpoint, he or she is engaging in evasive behavior.” Dinger & Dinger, supra 
note 22, at 37. Because the exiting driver is “evading imminent contact with law 
enforcement,” his conduct “gives rise to reasonable suspicion under Wardlow.” Id. 
The authors also turn to the Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. Arvizu 
for additional support. Id. at 37–39. In United States v. Arvizu, the Court upheld 
the stop of the defendant who was traveling on an unpaved and “little-traveled 
route used by smugglers to avoid the [Border Patrol] checkpoint.” 534 U.S. at 277. 
However, the choice of road, although it added significantly to the calculation of 
reasonable suspicion, was just one of numerous factors relied on by law 
enforcement in a totality analysis. Id. 
 153. 528 U.S. at 124. 
 154. Id. 
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However, the Court also emphasized that “when an officer, 
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches 
an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police 
and go about his business.”155 The Court was quick to point 
out, however, that although “refusal to cooperate, without 
more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 
justification needed for a detention or seizure,”156 when an 
individual engages in unprovoked flight, he does more than 
refuse to cooperate: “[f]light, by its very nature, is not ‘going 
about one’s business’; in fact, it is just the opposite.”157 
Putting aside, for now, that the nonexistent checkpoint 
being advertised on the interstate would be (if it existed) 
unlawful under Edmond,158 the driver who exits the road is 
merely seeking to avoid a seizure that is based neither on 
reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. While he may have 
altered his route, his apparent “business” is to drive from one 
location to another, and by exiting, he seeks to continue going 
about that business without having to stop. As previously 
mentioned,159 the choice to exit may have as much to do with 
seeking to avoid traffic congestion or the hassle of having to 
stop, wait in a line, and search for and produce vehicle 
documentation as it has to do with avoiding contact with the 
police. But even if the driver’s exit is motivated by the desire 
to steer clear of the police, this does not necessarily establish 
 
 155. Id. at 125 (referring to the Court’s prior holding in Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 498 (1983)). 
 156. Id. (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 (1991)). 
 157. Id. 
 158. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 32 (2000); supra text 
accompanying notes 60–63. 
 159. See supra text immediately following note 24. Of course, there could also 
be a myriad of reasons to use a particular exit off an interstate that have nothing 
to do with the advertised checkpoint. As stated by the court in Yousif: “Moreover, 
because there is nothing inherently unlawful or suspicious about a vehicle (even 
one with out-of-state license plates) exiting the highway, it should not be the case 
that the placement of signs by the police in front of the exit ramp transforms that 
facially innocent behavior into grounds for suspecting criminal activity.” United 
States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 829 (8th Cir. 2002). 
2018] RUSE CHECKPOINTS 419 
criminal wrongdoing, as noted by Justice Stevens in his 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz dissent: 
Unwanted attention from the local police need not be less 
discomforting simply because one’s secrets are not the stuff of 
criminal prosecutions. Moreover, those who have found—by reason 
of prejudice or misfortune—that encounters with the police may 
become adversarial or unpleasant without good cause will have 
grounds for worrying at any stop designed to elicit signs of 
suspicious behavior.160 
Returning to the idea that the exiting driver is declining 
the invitation to be seized without individualized suspicion, 
it is important to recall what Edmond instructs regarding 
such seizures: 
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches and seizures be 
reasonable. A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the 
absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. While such 
suspicion is not an “irreducible” component of reasonableness, we 
have recognized only limited circumstances in which the usual rule 
does not apply. . . . We have . . . upheld brief, suspicionless seizures 
of motorists at a fixed Border Patrol Checkpoint designed to 
intercept illegal aliens, and at a sobriety checkpoint aimed at 
removing drunk drivers from the road. In addition, . . . we 
suggested that a similar type of roadblock with the purpose of 
verifying drivers’ licenses and vehicle registrations would be 
permissible. In none of these cases, however, did we indicate 
approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to 
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.161 
In other words, suspicionless mass seizures arising from 
checkpoints conducted for purposes of highway safety or 
immigration enforcement would be unreasonable, were it not 
for the fact that they served important societal interests 
apart from ordinary crime control and law enforcement. Now 
if one considers the fact that the ruse checkpoint is 
advertised as a drug interdiction checkpoint, which, if it 
existed, would clearly violate the Fourth Amendment, using 
 
 160. 496 U.S. 444, 465 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 161. 531 U.S. at 37–38 (internal citations omitted). 
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the fact that the driver has exited the highway in order to 
avoid being unreasonably seized to generate reasonable 
suspicion is especially problematic. Judge Denvir Stith’s 
words bear repeating: “[t]here is something fundamentally 
unsettling and counterintuitive about labeling as suspicious 
a person’s conduct in avoiding the state’s own 
unconstitutional conduct.”162 
This raises the question not only of whether exiting the 
interstate constitutes flight, but more importantly, even if so, 
whether it is “unprovoked.” There seems to be a vast 
difference from the facts of Wardlow, where the defendant 
took off running at the mere sight of police officers, even 
though there was no indication that he was personally 
subject to their attention,163 and the driver who exits the 
interstate in order to prevent himself, personally, from being 
unlawfully seized. When the police threaten to unlawfully 
seize an individual, and that individual chooses not to be 
seized, is his decision to remove himself from the situation 
truly “unprovoked?” This author believes there is a strong 
argument for not ascribing any, let alone significant, weight 
in a totality analysis to a citizen’s decision to exit the 
highway prior to an announced unreasonable seizure. 
Of course, if the police rely instead on the occurrence of 
a traffic violation to conduct the stop, rather than on 
reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking, it is not necessary 
to engage in any totality analysis at all, as all that is required 
to justify the stop is the officer’s observation of the traffic 
 
 162. State v. Mack, 66 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Denver Stith, J., dissenting). 
 163. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000) (“Respondent looked in the 
direction of the officers and fled.”). This is not to say that fleeing from the scene 
of anticipated police activity in an area known for drug trafficking necessarily 
implicates one in individual wrongdoing. As Justice Stevens noted, “[I]t is a 
matter of common knowledge that men who are entirely innocent do sometimes 
fly from the scene of a crime through fear of being apprehended as the guilty 
parties, or from an unwillingness to appear as witnesses.” Id. at 131 (Stevens. J., 
dissenting) (quoting Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896)). However, 
I wish to contrast the facts of Wardlow with the usual ruse checkpoint facts, 
where the exiting motorist wants to avoid his own threatened seizure. 
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offense. Part III will address the traffic stop (the third 
variation of the ruse checkpoint), arguing that, Whren 
notwithstanding,164 the police should not be permitted to use 
pretextual traffic stops to conduct a narcotics investigation 
in the ruse checkpoint scenario. Before turning to Part III, 
however, the next Section of this Part further addresses 
avoidance and suspicion and explores a fascinating 
dichotomy between seizures and searches with respect the 
assertion of one’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
B. The Fork in the Road to Fourth Amendment Protection: 
Asserting the Right to Liberty versus the Right to Privacy 
Turning back to Wardlow, how could the defendant have 
avoided being seized without furnishing the reasonable 
suspicion used to justify his eventual seizure when he was 
apprehended? Perhaps he could have continued standing 
near that building, ignoring the police, and “going about his 
business.” Perhaps he could have walked away casually, 
being careful not to walk so quickly as to cross the line 
between avoidance and flight (or to catch the eye of the 
passing officers). But how does the driver, once notified of the 
upcoming checkpoint, implement his decision to not 
cooperate with the police interaction he believes to be ahead? 
Vehicle checkpoints are clearly considered seizures for 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment,165 but it is instructive 
here to examine the definition of a seizure. In Terry v. Ohio, 
the Court defined a seizure in terms of an officer’s use of 
“physical force or show of authority” to “in some way 
restrain[] the liberty of a citizen.”166 In U.S. v. Mendenhall, 
the Court further refined the definition of a seizure as 
follows: “[a] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the 
 
 164. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); supra text accompanying 
note 9. 
 165. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450. 
 166. 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). 
422 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person 
would have believed that he was not free to leave.”167 The 
Court added the final piece to the definition of a seizure in 
California v. Hodari D., holding that one is not seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes until such time as one comes 
under the control of the police, either by submission to 
authority or through the use of physical force.168 
Seizures, then, are all about compulsion. An individual 
is seized once his interaction with police has reached the 
point where a reasonable person in those circumstances 
would feel compelled to remain under police control, even if 
only temporarily. Of course, seizures must by nature be 
compulsive—chances are that most people who are stopped 
or arrested would rather not be. So, whereas compulsion is 
permitted and likely necessary in the context of the Fourth 
Amendment seizure, in at least two other key areas of 
criminal procedure, compulsion by the police is not 
permitted. First, in the context of Fourth Amendment 
searches, a suspect cannot be coerced into granting consent 
to search and any consent given must be voluntary in order 
to be valid.169 Secondly, in the context of police interrogation, 
the Fifth Amendment states, in the relevant part, that no 
person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.”170 In order to protect the right 
against compelled self-incrimination, police must provide 
suspects in custody with their Miranda warnings, advising 
 
 167. 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). Note that this is an objective test, based on the 
perception of the reasonable detainee, rather than on the subjective intent of the 
officer, although ultimately, it is the latter that determines whether or not one 
will be free to leave. 
 168. 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991). 
 169. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973). 
 170. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Suspects also have protection under the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which have been held 
to prohibit the introduction of confessions that are deemed to be involuntary. See 
id. amend V, XIV. See also, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286 (1936) 
(holding that the use of confessions obtained through torture and brutality 
constitutes “a clear denial of due process.”). 
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them, among other things, of their right to remain silent.171 
Further, if a suspect being subjected to custodial 
interrogation asserts the right to remain silent, or the right 
to have an attorney present, the police must cease the 
interrogation, thereby preventing the compelled statement 
from being made.172 Thus, there is a mechanism for the 
suspect to assert his right to be free of compulsion, and 
safeguards in place to ensure that he can enjoy that right. 
In contrast, however, while a suspect can assert his right 
to be free of a potential Fifth Amendment violation by way of 
a compelled statement, there is no clear mechanism for an 
individual to assert the right to be free of a Fourth 
Amendment violation by way of an unreasonable seizure.173 
In fact, the driver approaching a ruse checkpoint faces quite 
the dilemma: until he reaches the checkpoint, he is not 
seized, and therefore, has, at least in theory, freedom of 
movement. However, if he exercises that freedom to avoid 
being compelled to stop and submit to the police, his 
assertion, by changing his course, of the right to be free of a 
suspicionless seizure supplies the suspicion that can, in large 
part, justify his being compelled to stop after all. Or, 
alternatively, his choice to freely change his route will 
subject him to particularly vigilant traffic code enforcement 
as waiting officers try “to get reason to stop [him].”174 
An even starker contrast can be found within Fourth 
Amendment law, particularly with respect to how citizens 
seek to protect themselves from unlawful searches versus 
 
 171. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467–68 (1966). 
 172. Id. at 473–74. 
 173. Of course, if a defendant has been unreasonably seized, he can assert his 
Fourth Amendment rights post hoc by seeking to suppress any evidence gained 
as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 
655 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state prosecutions by holding that 
“all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution 
is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”). Of course, this is not 
the same as avoiding the seizure in the first place. 
 174. United States v. Carpenter, 462 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2006). 
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seizures. In order for government surveillance to be deemed 
a search for Fourth Amendment purposes, the government 
must “obtain information by physically intruding on a 
constitutionally protected area,” or in the absence of such an 
intrusion, obtain information by violating one’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.175 Of particular interest here is the 
fact that, in order to claim the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment with respect to searches by establishing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, one must vigorously assert 
and safeguard that privacy. If one fails to exercise sufficient 
diligence to hide from view what one “seeks to preserve as 
private,”176 one loses Fourth Amendment protection over 
what is in fact seen.177 Thus, even though one may ultimately 
be unsuccessful at keeping the object targeted by police 
surveillance hidden, the fact that significant precautions 
were taken to preserve privacy ensures that, at the very 
least, the police will need to abide by the requirements of the 
Fourth Amendment (generally, a warrant and probable 
 
 175. The “reasonable expectation privacy” test used to define a search in the 
absence of a physical intrusion is derived from Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967), and in particular from Justice Harlan’s formulation, found in his 
concurrence, which recognized a Fourth Amendment search as occurring when 
the government violates “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that 
society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
 176. Id. at 351. 
 177. Perhaps one of the most stringent applications of this principle can be 
found in California v. Ciraolo, where the Court upheld surveillance by two police 
officers from a private plane flying at 1,000 feet of the defendant’s back yard. 476 
U.S. 207, 209, 215 (1986). Despite the fact that the defendant had enclosed his 
yard with two tall fences, the Court found that he did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in his yard, at least not from aerial observation. Id. at 209, 
214. The defendant had, of course, asserted that “he ha[d] done all that can 
reasonably be expected to tell the world he wishes to maintain the privacy of his 
garden . . . without covering his yard.” Id. at 211. I have elsewhere argued that 
the Court’s search doctrine, particular in how it defines when a Fourth 
Amendment search has occurred, requires citizens to take extreme or “utmost” 
precautions to maintain privacy. See Nadia B. Soree, Show and Tell, Seek and 
Find: A Balanced Approach to Defining a Fourth Amendment Search and the 
Lessons of Rape Reform, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 210 (2013) (analogizing the 
utmost resistance requirement in traditional rape law to the Court’s narrow 
definition of a Fourth Amendment search). 
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cause) when conducting that surveillance. 
On the other hand, when a citizen vigorously seeks to 
maintain the integrity of his person and his freedom of 
movement by choosing to not drive into a checkpoint (an 
unlawful one, at that), his Fourth Amendment protection is 
actually diminished through his assertion of the right to be 
free from unreasonable seizures, and he is more vulnerable 
to being stopped. In fact, his own actions in seeking to avoid 
the advertised narcotics checkpoint help transform what 
would have been an unlawful stop at a highway checkpoint 
into a lawful one on the side of a rural road. While this 
dichotomy of approaches to Fourth Amendment protection 
may seem logical—after all, searches and seizures are 
different in nature—it also seems counterintuitive that an 
individual can do very little to avoid being unconstitutionally 
seized, even if the feared seizure is miles ahead. 
Further, although initially it seems that searches and 
seizures threaten different interests, if one adopts the 
eloquent and powerful description of Fourth Amendment 
privacy as “the right to be let alone” provided by Justices 
Warren and Brandeis in their groundbreaking article, The 
Right to Privacy,178 then one sees that the individual who 
draws his blinds against the prying eyes of the government 
is essentially protecting the same interest as the driver who 
takes the exit in order to keep driving without interference 
from that same government. One cannot escape noting the 
irony that, had our driver simply continued down the 
interstate, he would never have encountered a checkpoint at 
all because such a checkpoint would be, of course, unlawful 
under Edmond. The next Part explores the significance of 
this very important fact: that the success of the ruse 
checkpoint as a law enforcement technique is predicated on 
the government’s threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 178. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 193 (1890). 
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III. CALLING ALL CARS, FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION 
AHEAD: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE INADMISSIBILITY OF 
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH A THREATENED 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION 
This Part turns once more to Kentucky v. King,179 which 
was briefly detailed in the Introduction.180 To refresh the 
reader’s memory, in King, the Court addressed the extent to 
which police may rely on the presence of exigent 
circumstances to justify a warrantless entry into a home 
when the police had a role in creating the exigency.181 The 
Court upheld the search as reasonable, stating that “[w]here, 
as here, the police did not create the exigency by engaging or 
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth 
Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of 
evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.”182 Therefore, when 
officers, smelling the odor of marijuana emanating from an 
apartment, banged loudly on the door, apparently leading 
the occupants of the apartment to begin destroying the 
evidence, the officers were permitted to forcibly enter in 
order to preserve that evidence.183 The Court admonished: 
“[o]ccupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional 
rights but instead elect to attempt to destroy evidence have 
only themselves to blame for the warrantless exigent-
circumstances search that may ensue.”184 
Arguably, the result in King would have been different 
had the police, rather than simply banging and identifying 
themselves, threatened to immediately break down the door. 
Notice, under these alternative facts, the occupants no longer 
have the choice to “stand on their constitutional rights.” If 
 
 179. See 563 U.S. 452 (2011). 
 180. See supra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
 181. 563 U.S. at 461. 
 182. Id. at 462 (emphasis added). 
 183. Id. at 456. 
 184. Id. at 470. 
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they ignore the knock on the door, or indeed demand that the 
police return with a warrant, the police will nevertheless 
enter illegally if they follow through on the threat. As the 
King Court repeatedly emphasized the fact that the officers 
did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth 
Amendment,185 it is safe to assume that under our 
alternative scenario, the police would no longer be permitted 
to effectuate a warrantless entry based on exigent 
circumstances, despite the fact that the occupants may very 
well be destroying evidence (something that they have no 
constitutional right to do), and therefore, the exigency is real. 
What matters more than the existence of the exigency under 
these circumstances is the manner in which it arose. 
Analogizing the holding of King to the ruse checkpoint, 
just as the police may not create an exigency, which 
ordinarily would permit a warrantless entry, by violating or 
threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment—real as that 
exigency may be, assuming that evidence is actually being 
destroyed as a result of the officers’ actions—police may not 
create suspicion or create the opportunity to establish 
objective justification by violating or threatening to violate 
the Fourth Amendment. The ruse checkpoint is just that: a 
clear and manifest threat to violate the right to be free of 
unreasonable seizures. When the threat has the desired 
effect, causing drivers to exit the highway, police are ready 
and waiting to observe additional suspicious activity leading 
to reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking or the commission 
of a traffic offense—real or fabricated. 
While the Court has not directly addressed ruse 
narcotics checkpoints, this author believes that its decision 
in King should inform the inquiry in the present context as 
well. If the King decision is to be taken to its logical 
conclusion and applied to the ruse checkpoint, the driver’s 
choice to exit the highway should play no role in establishing 
reasonable suspicion. Further, regardless of Whren v. United 
 
 185. Id. at 455, 462, 472. 
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States, police should not be permitted to use the traffic stop 
as a pretext to conduct a narcotics investigation, even when 
(or if) the driver has committed a traffic violation.186 
Edmond addressed Whren’s holding when formulating 
its primary purpose test for narcotics checkpoints, noting 
that “Whren therefore reinforces the principle that, while 
[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-
cause Fourth Amendment analysis, programmatic purposes 
may be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment 
intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without 
individualized suspicion.”187 Arguably, the ruse checkpoint 
is, in fact, a scheme conducted without individualized 
suspicion, as all motorists are in some way subjected to the 
ruse, even though the stop of an individual motorist may be 
based, at least technically, on probable cause of a traffic 
violation. While it may be difficult in ordinary circumstances 
to discern the exact motivation of an officer when he stops a 
motorist, it is abundantly and objectively clear that during 
the ruse checkpoint operation, that motivation is to 
investigate narcotics trafficking. Thus, this author argues 
that Edmond could be read to support an inquiry into the 
programmatic purposes of the ruse checkpoint, creating a 
presumption that when the officer acting pursuant to the 
ruse checkpoint program stops a motorist—even one who has 
committed a traffic violation—he is truly conducting a 
narcotics investigation. 
One solution to rehabilitate a post-ruse checkpoint 
traffic stop would be to require police to shoulder a 
heightened burden of demonstrating that the traffic stop was 
indeed motivated by the desire to enforce the traffic laws in 
order to overcome that presumption.188 However, a more 
 
 186. See 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). 
 187. 531 U.S. 32, 45–46 (2000) (internal citations omitted). 
 188. While determining whether an officer was truly acting from a traffic-
enforcement motivation may again prove challenging, objective factors, such as 
the severity of the alleged traffic violation, could help inform such a 
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2018] RUSE CHECKPOINTS 429 
definitive and easily administered solution would be simply 
to create a rule that evidence obtained as a direct result of a 
ruse checkpoint operation is inadmissible. In other words, 
the police should not benefit from a threatened violation of 
the Fourth Amendment.189 
Of course, the exclusionary rule serves to remedy an 
actual constitutional violation, so a question arises as to 
whether the ruse, as a threat to violate the Fourth 
Amendment constitutes a violation in itself, or whether the 
actual constitutional violation occurs only when the driver is 
seized. Again, King is instructive, although not a perfect fit. 
If one assumes that the outcome of King would have been 
different had the officers violated or threatened to violate the 
Fourth Amendment, and through that misconduct, created 
the exigency, the actual constitutional violation would have 
been the warrantless entry into the apartment. If the 
baseline for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is 
the warrant requirement,190 the officers’ ability to enter 
without a warrant must be based on an exception to that 
requirement, such as the existence of an exigency.191 Because 
the officers are seeking to justify what otherwise would be an 
unreasonable search by asserting an exception to the 
warrant requirement, it is reasonable to insist, as the Court 
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did in King, that the police misconduct did not create the 
circumstances—the exigency—that the officers then wish to 
exploit. Thus, in effect, if the police violate the Fourth 
Amendment or threaten to do so, the exception to the 
warrant requirement is unavailable, rendering their 
warrantless entry indeed unreasonable. It is critical for 
purposes of the analogy to the ruse checkpoint to highlight 
that, for the King Court, in reaching its holding, the threat 
to violate the Fourth Amendment is as egregious as conduct 
that actually constitutes a violation of that Amendment. 
In the ruse narcotics checkpoint context, one cannot say 
that the threat to violate the Fourth Amendment—the sign 
advertising an unlawful narcotics checkpoint ahead—is itself 
a violation, because until a driver is actually stopped, there 
has been no seizure, nor search, under the Fourth 
Amendment. Addressing the first and second-generation 
ruse checkpoint stops, where the driver’s decision to exit the 
highway either generates entirely,192 or significantly 
contributes to,193 the reasonable suspicion used to justify the 
stop, it is fairly straightforward to argue that a citizen’s 
choice to prevent an unreasonable seizure of his person 
should not be used as an indication of wrongdoing.194 When 
the citizen’s choice to exit the highway is no longer taken into 
account, it will be much more difficult to establish the 
reasonable suspicion necessary to render the subsequent 
seizure reasonable. 
The third-generation ruse checkpoint stop, based on a 
traffic violation committed by the driver after having exited 
 
 192. As previously mentioned, most courts require more than simply exiting 
the highway to establish reasonable suspicion. See supra text accompanying note 
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 193. For discussion of cases in which the driver’s decision to exit the highway 
plays a significant role in establishing reasonable suspicion, see supra Section 
I.B. 
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the interstate, presents a bit more of a challenge in the 
exclusionary rule analysis. The officers in King actually 
entered the apartment without benefit of a warrant, which 
would have constituted a per se violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, had it not been for a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement. On the other hand, under Whren, the 
warrantless traffic stop is reasonable, as long as it is based 
on probable cause that the driver committed a traffic offense. 
To call the pretextual traffic stop unreasonable (despite the 
existence of probable cause) requires a new understanding of 
Whren. Many commentators, including this author, have 
been critical of Whren as a decision that permits officers 
broad discretion to investigate criminal activity unrelated to 
the traffic offense for which a driver is actually detained.195 
If Whren, however, is reframed as an exception to the 
requirement of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the 
Court’s ruling in King has great significance. 
Imagine an officer who believes, but has neither probable 
cause nor reasonable suspicion, that a driver of a particular 
vehicle is engaged in criminal activity, such as drug 
trafficking or possession. Of course, under Whren, the basis 
of the officer’s belief does not matter, whether it arises from 
the location, the type of vehicle being driven, or the age, 
gender, or even race of the driver.196 Knowing that he cannot 
stop the driver and vehicle to investigate the criminal 
activity he believes is occurring, he patiently waits for the 
driver to commit a traffic violation—a failure to signal, 
perhaps. Now the officer has the probable cause needed to 
stop the vehicle for the traffic violation, and the opportunity 
to conduct the narcotics investigation he would otherwise not 
have been permitted to conduct. 
This calls for an understanding of the pretextual traffic 
stop as, in fact, a suspicionless investigatory stop, rendered 
reasonable only by the existence of an independent, 
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unrelated (to the narcotics investigation) source of objective 
probable cause. Just as the objective existence of an exigency 
creates an exception allowing the warrantless entry into a 
home, the objective existence of a traffic violation creates, in 
effect, an exception to the requirement that a stop conducted 
for purposes of investigating criminal activity be based on 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of such activity, 
which this author will refer to, for purposes of the analogy to 
King, as the Whren exception.197 
Under the hypothetical King facts, officers who create 
the exigency by a violation or threatened violation of the 
Fourth Amendment could not then benefit from the exigent 
circumstances exception to render their warrantless search 
reasonable. Similarly, officers who threaten to violate the 
Fourth Amendment through the ruse checkpoint operation 
should not benefit from the Whren exception to render their 
subsequent narcotics stops reasonable. One could argue that 
the advertised checkpoint threat does not actually cause the 
driver to commit a traffic violation in the same way that the 
threat to violate the Fourth Amendment may cause the 
occupants of an apartment to destroy evidence. Nonetheless, 
the causal connection between the ruse and the traffic 
offense is undeniably strong. Not only does the ruse provide 
officers with the opportunity to target specific drivers (who 
find themselves on an unfamiliar road, often late at night) 
with a heightened purpose of observing a traffic offense, but 
as was seen in United States v. Johnson, the very location of 
the ruse may create a virtual certainty that a traffic offense 
will be committed.198 Thus, when the government’s threat to 
violate the Fourth Amendment creates the strong likelihood 
that a traffic violation will be committed or observed, 
government officers should not be permitted to use Whren to 
insulate what is, in fact, a narcotics investigation from 
constitutional scrutiny and the requirements of 
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individualized suspicion of narcotics-related wrongdoing. 
Finally, what of Justice Alito’s call, in King, to an 
informed and self-assured citizenry to assert their 
constitutional rights?199 The drivers who exit the interstate 
after being warned of an upcoming narcotics checkpoint are, 
albeit perhaps unknowingly, seeking to do just that. 
However, in the ruse checkpoint cases, rather than 
successfully avoiding an unconstitutional seizure, these 
drivers find themselves directly confronted by the police, 
stopped either because their desire not to be seized becomes 
a sign of wrongdoing or because they commit a traffic 
violation, no matter how minor—or simply because they are 
in the wrong place at the wrong time. 
CONCLUSION 
Simply put, the use of ruse checkpoints to target drivers 
violates the Fourth Amendment, or more precisely, the 
seizures resulting from the ruse are unreasonable. When the 
government threatens to violate the Fourth Amendment, it 
behaves unreasonably for purposes of that Amendment, and 
the advantages gained from such behavior should not 
permitted. The questions arising from use of the ruse 
checkpoint, such as through what mechanisms a citizen can 
assert his right to be free from unreasonable seizures, or to 
what extent a citizen’s avoidance of police interaction should 
be factored into an analysis of suspicion, or even to what 
extent officers should be permitted to conduct pretextual 
traffic stops, are not easily answered. Further, this Article 
does not suggest that police should abandon their efforts to 
interdict drugs, but argues that the methods used to do so 
matter. 
Thus, while difficulties arise in attempting to answer the 
above questions, the solution to this particular issue is 
startlingly simple: police should not be permitted to conduct 
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ruse checkpoints, and if a ruse checkpoint produces evidence, 
it should be inadmissible under the exclusionary rule. While 
the government is diligently seeking to enforce the laws, it 
must do so in a way that demonstrates respect for 
constitutional rights, rather than through the use of threats 
to abrogate those rights in order to achieve its ends.200 Courts 
should be cautious of on overly permissive approach to such 
deceptive tactics as exemplified by the ruse checkpoint, and 
draw the line suggested by King. As it stands now, the 
drivers who “choose [] to stand on their constitutional rights” 
by driving away from the advertised—but nonexistent—
unlawful checkpoint may very well find themselves instead 
standing on the side of the road, watching as their cars are 
searched. As Judge Denvir Stith pointedly stated, “[t]he 
public should not be put to such a choice.”201 
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